Legal library › Case digests › Civil Law
Case digest · Property of public dominion; conversion to patrimonial property; authority to sell government property
Laurel vs. Garcia
The Philippines’ lot in Roppongi, Tokyo, once the site of our embassy, had remained undeveloped since 1976. The government set it for bidding at a $225 million floor price, and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel asked the Supreme Court to stop the sale.
Facts
1956–1958
Under the Reparations Agreement with Japan of May 9, 1956, the Philippines acquired four properties in Japan. The Roppongi property, 3,179 square meters of land in Tokyo, was listed under the heading “Government Sector” through Reparations Contract No. 300 dated June 27, 1958, as land and building “for the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy”.
July 22, 1976
The embassy moved to Nampeidai when the Roppongi building needed major repairs. Because the government failed to provide the necessary funds, the property remained undeveloped.
1986–1988
President Aquino created a committee to study the disposition of the government’s properties in Japan. On July 25, 1987, she issued Executive Order No. 296, entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of reparations’ capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease or disposition. On October 4, 1988, she approved the committee’s recommendation to sell the Roppongi property.
The bidding
The property was twice set for bidding at a minimum floor price of $225 million. The first bidding failed because only one bidder qualified.
By February 1990
Salvador H. Laurel (G.R. No. 92013) and Dionisio S. Ojeda (G.R. No. 92047) filed petitions for prohibition. The Court issued a temporary restraining order effective February 20, 1990, stopping the bidding scheduled for February 21, 1990.
The defense
The respondents argued that Japanese law, not the Civil Code, governed, and that the property had become patrimonial because it had not been used for public service or diplomatic purposes for over 13 years and because the Executive and Congress had shown, by overt acts, an intent to convert it.
Issue
Can the Roppongi property be sold, and do the President and her officials have the authority to sell it?
Ruling
No. The Court granted the petitions, issued a writ of prohibition enjoining the sale, and made the temporary restraining order permanent.
The Roppongi property was acquired for the embassy, and it is property of public dominion intended for some public service under Art. 420(2) of the Civil Code. Philippine law, not the lex situs, governs the authority of officials to dispose of property of the State. Non-use did not convert the property into patrimonial property: abandonment of its public purpose must be definite, and the non-use here came from a lack of funds, not from the government’s deliberate will. None of the acts the respondents cited amounted to a formal declaration or a definite abandonment. Executive Order No. 296 does not declare that the properties lost their public character; the President’s approval of the sale was premature and did not have the force and effect of law; and neither Senate Resolution No. 55 nor the CARP law withdrew the property from public dominion. Even assuming the property were patrimonial, no law authorizes its conveyance, and such a conveyance must be authorized by a law enacted by Congress. The Court found no need to rule on the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 296. Feliciano, J., dissented, joined by Fernan, C.J., and Narvasa, Gancayco, Cortes and Medialdea, JJ.; in his view, the intent to convert need only be reasonably clear.
“It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government on his or her own sole will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence.”
Doctrine
Property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and cannot be alienated. It becomes patrimonial under Art. 422 only when it is no longer intended for public use or public service, and the change must be definite: “Abandonment cannot be inferred from the non-use alone specially if the non-use was attributable not to the government’s own deliberate and indubitable will but to a lack of financial support to repair and improve the property”. Citing Ignacio vs. Director of Lands (1960), the Court held that such property remains part of the public domain “until there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from being such”. And whether to sell is for both political branches: “Whether or not the Roppongi and related properties will eventually be sold is a policy determination where both the President and Congress must concur.”
Compare: patrimonial by law
In PNOC Alternative Fuels Corporation vs. National Grid Corporation of the Philippines, G.R. No. 224936, September 4, 2019, the law itself allowed portions of a State industrial zone to be leased, sold or conveyed to the private entities or persons operating businesses there, and the Court held that “an express declaration of alienability and disposability by the State negates the characterization of property as land of public dominion.”
Bar tip
Non-use is not conversion. For property of public dominion to become patrimonial, look for what the Court called “a law or formal declaration”; then, to sell government real property, look for a law authorizing the conveyance. Laurel left the sale of the Roppongi property to the President and Congress; it did not hold that the property can never be sold.
Hear it explained
Land Titles Jurisprudence Ep. 6, at 3:48
Follow Forlawssake
Get the next case explainer when it’s out.
New videos and episodes come out on YouTube, Spotify and TikTok. Follow there, and the app tells you when the next one is posted. It’s free.
This digest is general legal information for education, not legal advice, and it is not a substitute for reading the decision. Quoted passages are taken word for word from the full text.